

Thrust Area 7: Storage & Delivery Secure Energy Systems

PI: Pramod P. Khargonekar **Student:** Tejaswini Akunuri (graduated)

Description: The goal of this project is to investigate the concept of secure energy systems and formulate a concrete vision of a broad-based, comprehensive research program. An additional project goal is to develop architecture for modeling, analysis, and design of secure energy systems. An energy system consists of a collection of interconnected subsystems representing energy generation devices, energy consumption devices, transmission, distribution, and storage devices, and communications and computing devices. Such systems are dynamic and its operation is influenced by external perturbations. Definition of the system and it environment depends on the problem of interest. This project is motivated by strong interest among key decision makers in understanding and assuring security of energy systems in the face of various natural and man-made threats. Increasing penetration of renewable energy sources and capabilities offered by smart grid have the potential to enhance or degrade security of energy systems. Thus, these new developments present additional motivation for understanding of secure energy systems. Whereas there is an intuitive understanding of security and assurance, much work remains to be done in formulating precise definitions that cover problems of interest and devising an overall architecture that may facilitate a system level analysis and design of such secure energy systems. Taking into account rapid changes in the energy issues in a wide variety of private and public sectors, this project is a proactive effort to develop a vision and architecture for analysis and design of secure energy systems. It is expected that the results of this project will lead to future development and integration of specific analysis and design algorithms and software that will assist system designers in assessing and ensuring an appropriate level of system security.

The term security can take on different meanings depending upon the context. There are risks associated with intentional disruption of the system (sabotage) and operational risks of the system (whether from physical failure of the plant, human error, or market-based instability). Both can pose short- and long-term national security risks for the electric energy system which consists of the basic elements: generation, transmission, distribution, the load (users); and the control system. These elements are the choke points and can cause great harm by causing outages and moderate-term disabling of important elements in the energy system. We present the security issue by considering the various elements of the energy system one-by-one. At the generation end, we consider the security of the power plant. The attacks on the power plant are mainly physical i.e. the attack on the pipelines which carry the gas or oil (input to the turbine), attacks on the manual valves (which can be opened/closed physically), physical security of a nuclear power plant is in itself a topic which has been extensively researched. Thus we start with the generation system (local transmission lines and substations), and finally the control system which connects all these elements. Network security at the plant level (the connection of the control system and SCADA to the physical components) has also been considered.

Budget: \$220K Universities: UF



Page | 304



Progress Summary

We have focused much of our efforts in two related directions: electric grid and a graphical user interface that can help visualize potential security analysis tools. In electric grid, we have worked on the new issues that arise in the smart grid from the cyber-security perspective. These issues are already central to the future of the electric grid. We have also investigated integration of intermittent renewable energy into the electric grid. This is one of the major goals for the smart grid. A major goal is to understand how renewable electric power can be integrated into the electric grid while maintaining the FERC reliability requirements. With distributed renewable generation and smart grid enabling components, the electric grid becomes much more open to cyber-attacks. Here we are investigating attacks on the SCADA based state estimation by cyber-attacks on the measurement system. We are working on optimal deployment of the new synchrophasors (which will be integrated using the new NASPInet framework) for thwarting attacks on the SCADA system. A paper based on this work will be presented at the 2011 IEEE SmartGridCom. This work is being done in collaboration with colleagues at the University of California at Berkeley and Idaho National Labs. We have also written several papers on secure and reliable integration of renewable electricity production into the grid operations.

We next describe the outline of a graphical user interface which will form the external interface for the analysis system. This will serve as a framework for a tool which will be able to analyze the security situation of the energy system. The graphical user interface will consist of the various threats faced by the energy systems and the analysis of the situation in case of an attack. In the work conducted so far, we have found that there is no document or analysis present which takes a complete look at the energy system as a whole. We are hoping to develop a comprehensive view and research agenda for analysis and design of secure energy systems.

Proposals						
Title	Agency		Multi-institution	Funding		
DIEGO:	NSF		proposal with	Requested		
Distributed			several universities	(UF portion)	Not funded	
Intelligence			I was the UF PI	\$300K		
in						
Electricity						
Grid	DOE		I was UF-PI			
Operations					Not funded	
GRIP: Grid				\$300K		
with						
Intelligent						
Periphery						

Funds leveraged/new partnerships created:

Grants Awarded					
Title	Agency	Reference	PI, Co-	Funding	Project time
Collaborative Research: Integrating Random Energy Into the Smart Grid	NSF	Number	investigators and collaborators Khargonekar Poolla, Varaiya (Berkeley)	received \$273K	frame 3 years



2011 Annual Report

The initial framework for the Security Analysis GUI has been created. The salient features of the GUI include the user's inputs specifying the kind of generation system, transmission and generation system and the network architecture i.e., specifying the control system applications and network switches. The GUI has been created used C# language in Visual Studio 2010 tool. The concept of this framework has been based on the following elements:

- Degree of loss and damage due to the impact of the hazard.
- Degree of exposure to the hazard i.e., the likelihood of being exposed to the hazards of as certain degree and the susceptibility of an element at risk to suffer loss and damages.
- Degree of capacity of resilience i.e., the ability of a system to anticipate, cope with/absorb, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard or disaster. For example, the vulnerability of the electric power system might be assessed in terms of the frequency of major blackouts and the associated severity. A number of approaches can be undertaken for the vulnerability assessment depending on the type of system, the objective of the analysis and the available information.


The GUI developed has the functionalities for analyzing the energy system as a complete system, including the generation, transmission, distribution and the control system; the snapshots of the GUI are as follows:

new Security Analysis of Energy Systems	Annual Annual And	
<u>File Edit T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp		
i 🗅 📂 📕 🔿 X 🖻 📽 🛛		
Energy System Threats and Vulnerabilities Security Metrics R	esults	
	uts and properties to analyze the security of the system.	
Select the Generation System Select	e Generation Systems	
Transmission System Inputs	Thermal Hydroelectric Gas Solar	
O Do not model		
	OK Cancel	
📀 🚊 🙋 🧔 🖭 🗶 🐺 🔼		▲ 隆 🔐 .adl 🐠 5:43 PM 3/25/2011

By clicking the Select button, the user can select the type of generation system. This would give the user the ability to analyze the selected energy system. The database at the back-end would contain the elements which are contained in the generation system. Similarly, the user can select the transmission, distribution and control system elements. The inputs are reflected back for the user to review and make changes if needed.








The threats and security metrics for the analysis are then selected and the analysis yields results which can be viewed as a pie chart or a bar graph.

File Edit Energy System Threats and Vulnerabilities Select the security metrics for analysis Select the security metrics for analysis Distribution system Distribution system Distribution system Control system Cyber Attacks Cyber Attacks Communication network HMIs Gateway servers Histonian servers SCADA servers	Security Analysis of Energy Systems	
Energy System Threats and Vulnerabilities Security Metrics Results Select the security metrics for analysis Physical Attacks Outages and Trips I line outage Generator outage Substation outage Substation outage Control system Cyber Attacks Communication network HMIs Gateway servers Histonian servers	<u>File Edit I</u> ools <u>H</u> elp	
Select the security metrics for analysis Physical Attacks Outages and Trips Generation system I line outage Distribution system Generator outage Control system Substation outage Control system Generator bus trip Cyber Attacks Outages short/open Communication network Distribution servers HMIs Gatages	🗋 🖆 🛃 🔿 👃 🛍 🛍 🐵	
Select the security metrics for analysis Physical Attacks Outages and Trips Generation system I line outage Distribution system Generator outage Control system Substation outage Control system Generator bus trip Cyber Attacks Outages short/open Communication network Distribution servers HMIs Gatages	Energy System Threats and Vulnerabilities Security Metrics Results	
	Select the security metrics for and Physical Attacks Generation system Distribution system Control system Cyber Attacks Cyber Attacks Generation network HMIs Gateway servers Historian servers	Outages and Trips I Line outage Generator outage Substation outage Load bus trip Generator bus trip Distribution feeder short/open *



Page | 307





Publications:

E. Bitar, R. Rajagopal, P. P. Khargonekar, K. R. Poolla, and P. Varaiya, "Bringing Wind Energy to Market," submitted for publication to IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

E. Bitar, A. Giani, R. Rajagopal, D. Varagnolo, P. P. Khargonekar, K. Poolla, P. P. Varaiya, "Optimal Contracts for Wind Power Producers in Electricity Markets," Proc. 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 1919-1926, December 2010.

E. Bitar, R. Rajagopal, P. P. Khargonekar, and K. Poolla, "Optimal Bidding Strategies for Wind Power Producers: the Role of Reserve Margins and Energy Storage," Proc. American Control Conference, pp., June 2011.

A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, M. McQueen, P. P. Khargonekar, and K. Poolla, "Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures," Proc. IEEE Smart Grid Comm, pp. 2011.

E. Bitar, P. P. Khargonekar, and K. Poolla, "Systems and Control Opportunities in the Integration of Renewable Energy into the Smart Grid," to appear in the Proc. International Federation of Automatic Control, 2011.

D. Bakken, A. Bose, K. M. Chandy, P. P. Khargonekar, A. Kuh, S. Low, A. von Meier, K. Poolla, P. P. Varaiya, and F. Wu, "GRIP – Grids with Intelligent Periphery: Control Architectures for Grid2050," Proc. IEEE Smart Grid Comm, pp. 2011

E. Baeyens, E. Bitar, P. P. Khargonekar, K. Poolla, "Wind Energy Aggregation: A Coalitional Game Approach," Proc. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. , 2011.

E. Bitar, K. Poolla, P. P. Khargonekar, R. Rajagopal, P. Varaiya, and F. Wu, "Selling Random Wind," Proc. 2012 Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science.



Page | 308